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o. Introduction 
As is well-known, Focus can affect the meaning of sentences involving 
adnominal quantifiers in various ways. This paper deals with three of the cases 
discussed in the literature, which I refer to as strong or partitive readings of 
weak quantifiers «(1» ,  proportional readings of weak and strong quantifiers «2», 
and focus-affected readings of weak quantifiers «3); capitals indicate stress) . 
( 1 )  SOME cowboys decided to go  HOME. 
,., some of the cowboys decided to go home 
(2) a.  MOST boys WALKED to the station. 
,., most boys who somehow got to the station walked there 
b .  THREE boys WALKED to the station. 
,., three of the boys who somehow got to the station walked to the 
station 
(3) Few/FEW INCOMPETENT cooks applied . 
::=: few of the applying cooks were incompetent 
Below the examples I have given paraphrases of the readings we are concerned 
with here, and which seem the most natural ones for these examples. To see that 
these are remarkable , let us briefly recapitulate what the interpretat ion of a wel l ­
behaved adnominal quantifier should look like . Syntactical ly a quant ifier l ike 
some in (1) has as its sister a nominal argument, which - for lack of commitment 
- I refer to as the N-argument. The resulting NP (DP) is s ister to a verbal 
projection, labeled the V-argument in the remainder of this paper. Ideal ly ,  we 
would like the meaning of N to provide the first argument - the restrictor - of the 
quantifier ,  and V to provide the second - the nuclear scope - in  the semantics . 
An ideal mapping would thus be as in (4) . 
(4) � 
NP V 
/,/_____________ Nuclear Scope 
Quant . N 
Restrictor 
Against this background , the paraphrases in (1) through (3)  are indeed weird: In 
( 1 )  the partitive marker of the seems to appear out of thin air. In (2) materia l 
from the V -argument figures in the restrictor (paraphrased by the re lative 
clauses) , and finally , in (3) part of the V argument serves as the restrictor, whi le 
part of the N argument shows up in the nuclear scope . 
As said above , all of these phenomena have received conc ise syntactic and 
semantic treatments in order to account for their peculiarities (e . g. Eckardt 1 994, 
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GeilfuB 1993, Herburger 1992, de Hoop 1992 , de Hoop & Sola 1995 , Jager 
1995 , Partee 1989) . Most of these theories have in common that they adjust the 
compositional semantics (and some of them the syntax) in such a way that the 
truth-conditions of the sentences actually change (usually through some rule of 
association with focus) . Let us call these semantic accounts. 
In this paper I will elaborate on these accounts , making three claims : i) all 
these phenomena are instances of the same general phenomenon, ii) the 
appropriate treatment of these examples is pragmatic , and iii) no construction 
specific rules or devices are necessary (Le .  special rules of LF construal , lexical 
ambiguities of quantifiers , and/or rules of association with focus that are specific 
to certain constructions or lexical items) . I thus advocate a pragmatic account. 
Accordingly , the paper consist of two parts : A) to show that such an 
alternative and simpler approach can be provided, and B) to demonstrate that it 
is empirically superior to the analyses referred to above . As for A) , there are two 
basic ingredients to the pragmatic account: For one thing , strong adnominal 
quantifiers are restricted by WesterstAhlian Resource Domain Variables (RDVs) . 
For another, the process of selecting RDVs in out-of-the-blue cases heavily relies 
on Topic/Focus/Background structure (TFBS) . The particular version of Focus 
theory used is an extended Roothian focus semantics as proposed in Biiring 1995 . 
The upshot of the B)-part will be that the truth conditions sketched in the 
paraphrases above and derived by the compositional semantics in the semantic 
accounts are mostly too strict, capturing only a subset of the possible readings of 
these sentences ,  namely the out-of-context cases . In providing specific contexts 
I will show that the sentences can convey meanings that are incompatible with 
the truth conditions of the semantic accounts , but predicted by the pragmatic one . 
This is why I refer to the latter as a 'weak' analysis : It assigns truth conditions 
that are much less specific than in the semantic accounts . 
I will first outline the assumptions about TFBS I am making (section 1) and 
then turn to the analysis of the weak quantifier cases (section 2). Following that 
I wil l  introduce the concept of RDVs and apply them in the analyses of the 
strong quantifier cases (section 3 ) .  Finally I ' ll turn to focus-affected readings 
(section 4) . In comparing the present proposal to the ones made in the l iterature 
in terms of truth conditions I wil l use a somewhat unified version of the latter, 
basically to facil itate comparison .  I therefore include an appendix where some of 
the proposed analyses are summarized and compared in more detail . 
1 .  Guessing Contexts : Topic/Focus/Background Structure 
One pecul iarity of the sentences in ( 1 )  through (3) is that none of them can 
normally be used as a discourse initial sentence . For one thing , adnominal 
quantifiers l ike the given ones require aforementioned groups or domains . For 
another, the TFBS is incompatible with sentence Focus, that is ,  none of the 
sentences with the accentuation ind icated can represent an all-new utterance . 
Assuming that discourse initial sentences need to be all-new , (1) through (3) call 
for specified contexts . 
A WEAK THEORY OF STRONG READINGS 
What do we do when we encounter such a sentence out of the blue? 
Naturally enough, we try to construct a context by means of whatever 
information the pertinent sentence itself provides . And the best source of 
information we have - apart from lexically based presuppositions - is the TFBS , 
as indicated by intonation. Let us therefore look at the relation between 
intonation and context in more detail .  
1 . 1 .  Focus 
According to standard wisdom, Focus (indicated by a falling pitch contour) 
signals the position of new information in the sentence . In question/answer pairs , 
the focused constituent must correspond to the wh-phrase in the question, i . e .  the 
requested information (the actual Focus - in contradistinction to the accent - is 
marked by a subscript F ,  as proposed in Jackendoff 1972). 
(5) a. What did she give to John? 
b .  She gave [the BOOK]F to John. 
b: # She GA VEF the book to John. 
We take asking questions to be an archetypal case of establishing a Discourse 
Topic (or D-Topic) . Questions, and D-Topics in general are represented as sets 
of propositions , namely the set of possible answers/possible continuations of the 
discourse (Hamblin 1973) . The term question will be used throughout for sets of 
propositions (suggesting that every declarative answers an (implicit) question) . 
Since we know that the Focus in the answer must correspond to the wh-part 
of the question, we can say that a declarative sentence with Focus defines the (set 
of) question(s) it is suited to answer . Descriptively the question is derived by 
replacing the focus by an appropriate wh-word (ignoring yes/no questions) .  
Formally , the question i s  the set o f  propositions w e  get by replacing the meaning 
of the Focus in the sentence meaning with (contextually salient and plausible) 
type identical alternatives .  Following Rooth 1 985 we call this set of propositions 
the Focus Value of sentence S, [ S ]  f. Question/answer matching then is nothing 
more than the requirement that [ S ]  f equal the D-Topic . 
(6) Discourse Appropriateness Condition (preliminary) : 
For a question/answer pair Q/ A to be wellformed , it must hold that 
[ Q ] o = [ A ] F. l 
Upon hearing a sentence S out-of-the-blue it is a good guess to take the D-Topic 
to be [ S ]  f.  We refer to this as reconstructed D-Topics or reconstructed questions 
(henceforth I will use paraphrases in a A-categorial language as in (7. b) to 
characterize such meanings) . 
(7) a .  
b .  
She gave [the BOOK]F to  John. 
[ she gave [the BOOKh to John ] f = { [ she gave the book to 
John ] 0, [ she gave the journal to John] 0, [ she gave the newspaper 
to John ] o , . . . } = [ Ap . 3x E ALT(the-book) & p = she gave x to 
John ] 0 = [ What did she give to John? ] 0 
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We pretend that a declarative sentence with focus allows for reconstructing the 
D-Topic . 
1 . 2. Topic 
Next note that the sentences we are discussing involve two accents , the first of 
which is not a Focus accent, but what I call a Topic accent. A constituent thus 
marked is called a Sentence Internal Topic or S-Topic - indicated by [ . . .  h 
brackets . To see why S-Topics are different from Foci let us look at their impact 
on question/answer pairs . Unlike the Focus, S-Topics do not correspond to the 
wh-word . Rather they indicate a departure from the original question. Consider 
(8) : 
(8) What did the older boys do? 
a .  The older boys [ate ICE CREAM]F '  
b .  [BILLh [ate ICE CREAM]F '  
c .  The [YOUNGh boys [ate ICE CREAMlF '  
d .  The [GIRLSh [ate ICE CREAM]F '  
e .  # Bill [ate ICE CREAM]p.  
f. # The young boys [ate ICE CREAM]F' 
g .  # The g irls [ate ICE CREAM]F '  
(8 . a) presents the 'ordinary ' answer with just a Focus accent. The answers in 
(8 .b) through (8 . d) ,  however, do not match the question (formally : [ A ] f ¢ 
[ Q ] 0, as can easily be seen by just replacing the Focus with the appropriate 
question word) . To legitimate such a deviance , an S-Topic has to be present on 
the constituent where D-Topic and [ A ] f differ. Note that leaving out the first 
accent, as shown in (8 . e) through (8 .g) ,  renders these sentences il lformed as 
answers to the question in (8) , just as we would expect given (6) . 
S-Topics are thus used if the Focus Value of A does not equal the D-Topic . 
This effect can be described as follows : Replacing the meaning of the S-Topic by 
an appropriate type identical alternative must y ield the D-Topic (the older boys, 
older and older boys, respectively , in (8 . b) through (8 .d» . 
Hearing a declarative sentence with S-Topic and Focus out-of-the-blue we 
know that one of the questions we can get by i) replacing the focus by the 
corresponding wh-word , and ii) replacing the S-Topic by some alternative must 
be the D-Topic . A declarative sentence with S-Topic and Focus thus al lows for 
reconstructing a set of potential D-Topics . This set is called the Topic Value of 
S, [ S  ] ' . 
(9) a .  B i l l  [ate ICE CREAM]F = > What did B i l l  do? 
b .  [BILLh [ate ICE CREAM]F = > What did Bill do ? o r  What did 
Bob do ? or What did the boys do ? or What did you do ? or . . .  
c .  [ BILLr [ate ICE CREAM]F ] , = [ AP . 3GQ E ALT(AR. R(Bil l»  & 
P = Ap . 3V E ALT(eat(icecream) & p = GQ(V) ] o 
We thus replace (6) by ( 10) : 
( 10) Discourse Appropriateness Condition (final) : 
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For a question/answer pair Q/ A to be wellformed, it must hold that 
[ Q ] o  E [ A ] , . 2  
According to this theory, sentences (1)  through (3) contain Focus and - at  least 
in the case of ( 1 )  and (2) - Topic accents . Both accents have a certain pragmatic 
function, i . e .  they serve to make the utterance suited to a particular Discourse 
Topic . In tum, a single sentence with intonational structure defines the set of 
potential contexts (D-Topics) it can be used in. 
2. Strong Readings for Weak Determiners 
2. 1 .  Wide Focus 
Let us now try to apply our guessing strategy to ( 1 ) ,  repeated here . 
( 1 1 )  a .  [Someh cowboys decided [to stay home]F '  
b .  [ ( 1 l . a) ] ' = [ AP . 3Q[QEALT(some) & 
P = Ap . 3R[REALT(stay(home» & 
p = Q(cowbOYS)(Ax .decide(x,R(x» )] ] ] 0 
In ( 1 l .b) I have given a formal-language equivalent to the Topic Value of ( 1 l . a) .  
More perspicuously , what we do is replace both S-Topic and Focus by 
contextually relevant alternatives , here determiners and infinitival clauses . 
( 1 2) { the/all/many/some/two} cowboys decided {to stay home, to go 
gambling/to shave . . .  } 
We know that the second pair of curly brackets - the Focus alternatives - reduces 
to something as s imple as on what .  As for the first - the S-Topic - there is no 
way to decide which alternative equals the one in the D-Topic (note that by ( 1 0) 
it suffices that any old element in [ ( l l . a) ] '  equal the D-Topic) . We thus 
conclude that the D-Topic must have been one of the questions in ( 1 3 ) .  
( 1 3) What d id  the/all/most/some/two cowboys decide on? 
Whichever of these (or similar) questions might have been the actual D(iscourse)­
Topic , it is about a group of cowboys .  That is, we know upon hearing ( 1 l . a) -
even in isolation - that it requires a D-Topic that has to do with cowboys .  Taking 
these to be a superset of the ' some cowboys'  (a superset antecedent) in ( 1 l . a) 
g ives us a partitive reading . One such case is il lustrated in ( 14) . 
( 14) There were twenty cowboys in the saloon . [TWOh cowboys were 
watching the door . 
In other words , the partitive effect in a sentence l ike ( 1 l . a) is not due to the 
semantics of the sentence itself, but to the kind of contexts it indicates . We infer 
that there must be an antecedent NP which shares the head noun with the subject 
in ( l l . a) .  Let us call this part-of relation between the NP and its antecedent a 
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token panitive. Token partitivity is just one possibility : The antecedent of two 
cowboys might as well be a disjoined set of cowboys, i . e .  a co-hyponym. This 
interpretation is the most plausible in a case like ( 15) .  
( 15) The town was bursting with tension. A cowboy was standing next to the 
door of the saloon, nervously playing with his gun. TWOT cowboys were 
posted next to each window. 
Two cowboys in ( 15) cannot be a subset of the one cowboy mentioned before (as 
in ( 14» . Nevertheless its intonational contour - the S-Topic accent - is clearly 
licensed by the earlier NP a cowboy , with which it shares the head noun (let us 
call this a token panitive) . The treatment proposed here covers both these cases, 
since it has nothing to say about the relation between referents but only between 
sets of propositions . Nor does it require that the NPs involved are referential at 
all ,  which allows us to account for generic panitives as in ( 1 6) .  
( 16) Q :  What do you call a group o f  three musicians? 
A :  Dunno . FOURT musicians you call a QUARTETF. 
[ ( 16A) ] f differs from [ ( 16Q) ] 0 in much the same way as [ (8 . c) ] f from 
[ (8) ] 0 above : It answers a slightly different question, using the S-Topic to 
indicate that difference. Again, this is all the effect we ascribe to the intonational 
marking , regardless of the referential status of the NPs thus marked . 
Let us briefly compare this treatment to others proposed in the l iterature . 
According to some authors , weak determiners are ambiguous between a cardinal 
and a quantificational version (Partee 1 987, Diesing 1 992 , de Hoop 1 992) . The 
latter is represented as a generalized quantifier (the former is presumably just a 
cardinality predicate) . Note that this does not prima fac ie explain the meaning 
d ifference . It only does if we make the additional assumption that the general ized 
quantifier presupposes something about the set that forms its restrictor . This is 
usually assumed to be an existential presupposition , e . g .  to the effect that the 
restrictor set is presupposed to be non-empty . It  should be noted , however. that 
this cannot be a presupposition in the usual sense , e . g .  knowledge assumed to be 
shared by speaker and hearer, s ince examples l ike ( 1 7) clearly do not involve any 
existential commitments on the part of the person asking . 
( 1 7) Q :  
A :  
Are there any cookies in this room? 
SOM� cookies are [ in  the cupboardl F .  
Furthermore such theories do not  explain why the strong determiners a lways bear 
a Topic accent . I t  has to be a lexical property of the quantifier version that it is 
obligatorily associated with a Topic accent, while its card inal twin must be 
lexically excluded from being thus marked . Finally notice that the ' partitive ' 
option is available both for existential and for generic NPs on  the account 
advocated here (see ( 14) and ( 1 6) above) . That means that the property of  being 
'partitive ' cannot be tied to the property of being a true quantifier :  both 
existentials and generics show the pertinent effect if marked as S-Topics . ]  
A n  approach towards these phenomena that i s  much closer to the present 
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one is to assume that the partitive weak quantifiers do not establish a relation 
between sets but between discourse referents . A framework in which such an 
effect is derived compositionally is presented in Jager 1995 , according to which 
the NP TWO cowboys must introduce a discourse referent that is a subset of a 
referent already in the file . At first glance this analysis must surrender to 
examples of token partitivity like ( 15) above . But this can be fixed by appropriate 
meaning postulates that make available supersets and the like . Problems arise , 
however, with generics as well as with examples like ( 1 7) .  Obviously , we'd have 
to introduce additional machinery , e . g .  discourse structures that allow for things 
like generic individuals and potential individuals .  
2. 2. Narrow Focus 
Let us now tum to an argument against localizing the 'partitive ' effect in the 
semantics of the determiner altogether. Consider (2 .b) ,  repeated here as ( I 8 .b) .  
( 1 8) a .  
b .  
[THREEh boys [walked to the STATIONh. 
[THREEh boys [W ALKED]F to the station. 
Recall that according to the theory advocated here , the descriptive content of an 
antecedent NP is reconstructed from that part of the sentence that is neither 
Focus nor S-Topic (let us call this the Background) . No reference was made to 
the notions of N-argument and V-argument in the sense of section 0 above . So 
far we only looked at examples parallel to ( 1 8 . a) ,  where in fact only the head 
noun of the quantified NP is in the Background . Here , using the Background to 
reconstruct the D-Topic comes down to the same as using the N-complement of 
the determiner. However , if the Background contains more material than just the 
N-argument, we predict that a similar strategy will apply to (non-focused) 
material from the V-argument. This is what happens in ( 1 8 .b) , where the accent 
on the verb unambiguously indicates narrow Focus . First, we infer again that 
there must have been an antecedent NP denoting boys, but furthermore , we take 
it that these boys all got to the station somehow (or at least tried to) . 4  That is, we 
find the very same effect as in the previous subsection, except that this time the 
reconstructed antecedent gets its descriptive content from material outside of the 
N-argument. This clearly indicates that any theory that derives the partitive effect 
from just some requirement on the set denoted by the N-argument falls short of 
capturing the phenomenon entirely . 
3. Strong Quantifiers 
In the previous sect ion we only dealt with cases where the Focus effect wasn' t  
truth-conditional but concerned the presupposition of the sentences . Therefore , 
the pragmatic account lent itself quite naturally to analyzing these cases . If we 
now want to go on to cases involving strong quantifiers , it seems we have to find 
some way to let Focus influence truth-conditions , for changes in truth conditions 
are exactly what we find . And in fact, we will do so by making use of 
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WesterstAhl ' s  ( 1985) concept of Resource Domain Variables, i . e .  free variables 
that function as additional restrictors on the quantifier, and whose value is 
provided anaphorically by the discourse ( i .e .  the assignment) . In using RDVs 
rather than semantic rules I am making two essential claims : First, that TFBS 
does not directly enter the compositional semantics but only through the 
discourse, that is , uniformly and at few, well-defined places (this point is made 
e .g .  in von Fintel 1994 , and - to a certain extent - in Rooth 1992) . And second, 
accordingly, that the Focus effect on quantifiers is less direct than assumed in the 
semantic approaches, i . e .  that specific contexts can provide specific RDVs,  
which in tum yield truth conditions that are not available in  the semantic 
approaches. 
The effect of RDVs can most easily be seen in an example like ( 19)/( 1 9 . a) :  
O f  course , most women does not mean most o f  the women in the world , but most 
of the women standing in the market place . Using RDVs we express this by 
superscripting the quantifier with a variable - mostC - which represents a 
contextually specified variable (here : the property of being in the market place) 
that is intersected with the meaning of the N-argument : [ most ] ( [  women ] n 
[ C ] )( [ stood in the front ] ) . Note that just as almost every sentence involving 
quantifiers like every, most etc . is likely to be false without RDVs, these very 
sentences would all trivially be true if RDVs were freely available (e .g .  if C 
were systematically taken to equal the meaning of the V-argument) . Obviously 
RDVs have to be heavily restricted by context. However, they cannot be 
determined unambiguously (cf. ( 19 .b» , nor are they always provided by discourse 
referents or groups previously mentioned (as can be seen in ( 1 9 . c» . 
( 1 9) There were dozens of people in the market place . . .  
a .  Mostc WOMEN stood in the FRONT. 
b .  Fifteen women entered the stage . MOSTc women waved their hands .  
(C = being in the market place or C = being on the stage) 
c .  Let  us  next tum to the village Simmersbach . Mostc men over 55 are 
unemployed . (C = being/living in Simmersbach) 
What I will argue for is (of course) that TFBS helps us guessing contexts , and 
that context, in tum, helps us guessing RDVs . 
Again, if nothing but the N-argument is in the Background - as in (20 . a) -
no effects obtain in zero-context . All we learn about the D-Topic from a sentence 
like (20 .a) is that boys figure in it, which, taken as the property assigned to C ,  
makes no difference wrt. truth-condition . Accordingly , we only notice the effect 
of RDVs with sentences that cannot possibly have wide Focus in the V-argument, 
such as (2 . a) ,  repeated here . 
(20) a .  
b .  
c .  
[mostclr. boys [walked to the STATIONk [MOSr-h boys WALKEDF to the station . 
[ most ] ( [ boy ] n [ c ] )( [ walk to the station ] ) 
\ 
>'x . x  is a boy who gets to the station somehow 
In these cases we infer from the Background - ' . . .  boys . . .  to the station' - that 
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boys headed towards the station must have been part of the previous discourse . 
If we restrict most - through the variable C - to the set of these boys,  we obtain 
a truth conditional effect: the sentence seems to be about the proportion of 
walkers among those going to the station. 
To appreciate this treatment and realize its advantages , let us see how a 
semantic account would handle these cases. Obviously , (20) boils down to 
something like ' take the V-argument minus the Focus and use it as an additional 
restrictor' .  In Alternative Semantics there is a straightforward way to get 
something 'minus the focus ' ,  namely by forming the union set of the alternatives 
to that something. This is called trivializing a Focus value . For example while 
[ WALKEDF to the station ] f is the set of properties like 'walked to the station' , 
'drove to the station' , or ' hitchhiked to the station' , U [ WALKEDF to the 
station ] f - its trivialization - is simply the property to have got to the station 
somehow . Thus , the semantic treatment can be summarized as in (2 1 )  (see 
appendix for details & references) . 
(2 1 )  Restrict the quantifier b¥ the trivialization of the focus value of the V­
argument [ most(N)(V) ] 0 = [ most ] O( [ N ]  0 n U [ V ]  f)( [ V ]  0) 
Rule (2 1 ) ,  too , interprets (20 .b) as (20 . c) ,  as shown in (22) . 
(22) most( [ boys ] 0 n U [ W  ALKEDF to the station ] f)( [ W  ALKEDF to the 
station ] 0) 
The difference , however, is that (2 1 )  does so mechanically , while (20) is just one 
possible result of finding a decent RDV.  Thus we should be able to construct 
specific contexts in which U [ V  -argument ] is not among the properties available 
as RDVs. And in fact, as Eckardt ( 1994) points out, in such cases the semantic 
account as in (21) leads to inappropriate truth conditions . Her example is given 
in (23 ) .  
(23) Max had to  polish ten cars this afternoon. When I came back, six cars 
still stood in front of the garage , not even touched by Max . He had 
pol ished MOST T cars CAREFULLY F '  
� he had pol ished most of the cars that he  polished carefully 
Intuitively , (23) is plain nonsense : If Max hasn 't  even touched six out of ten 
cars , he cannot have pol ished most cars carefully . However, by (2 1 )  (23) should 
mean that most cars he pol ished , he polished carefully . If he had in fact polished 
three cars till they shone l ike the sun, (23) should be true . Thus, as Eckardt 
points out , (21) del ivers wrong truth conditions . 5  
For the pragmatic account to  handle this case we  must assume that ' cars he 
pol ished ' is not an available RDV in this specific context (while both ' the cars he 
ought to pol ish ' and ' the cars he didn ' t  polish ' are , as can be seen by replacing 
the last sentence in (23) by He had smeared MOST cars with some undefinable 
substance) . This seems plausible , given the fact that in general , differences 
between two given sets cannot antecede anaphors . 
To sum up this section, I have shown that truth conditional effects with 
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strong quantifiers can be accounted for pragmatically , if we make use of RDVs. 
A strong argument for this treatment can be made using examples like Eckardt' s  
(23) ,  where the pragmatic account - despite its general unspecificity - does not 
allow for the truth conditions assigned by the semantic one (and is right in doing 
so) . 
4. Focus in the N-Argument 
Let us finally tum to cases like (3) , repeated here : 
(24) Few/FEWT INCOMPETENTF cooks applied . 
The example is taken from Herburger 1 992, where cases like these are called 
focus-affected readings. Herburger makes the strong claim that these differ from 
parallel constructions without this accent pattern in terms of truth conditions . For 
this to hold, one has to assume that few is an asymmetric quantifier, Le .  that 
FEW(A)(B) is not equal to FEW(B)(A) . The reason is that Herburger 's  account 
- as all semantic accounts - conjoins sentence internal material with the restrictor 
andlor the nuclear scope . But when does that make a difference? If we assume 
that , in any event, the N-argument is part of the restrictor and the V-argument is 
part of the nuclear scope , adding N material to the restrictor (or V material to 
the nuclear scope) trivially won't make any difference . Adding N-material to the 
nuclear scope makes no difference either, since all natural language determiners 
are conservative (Le .  Q(A)(B) equals Q(A)(A () B) .  That leaves us with adding V­
material to the restrictor, which in tum only makes a difference if the determiner 
is non-symmetric (since otherwise Q(A)(B) = Q(B)(A) = Q(A () B)(A () B) and 
so forth) . Therefore , truth conditional effects can only be expected with non­
symmetric quantifiers . 
Let us now look at Herburger 's  argument . She seems to assume something 
along the l ines of (25 . a) to be the meaning of FEW. Then (25 . b) correctly comes 
out as meaning 'only a small percentage of the marriages are marriages that are 
divorced in the first year' . But (25 . c) will incorrectly mean ' only a small 
percentage of the incompetent cooks applied ' «25 .d» . 
(25) a .  [ FEW(N)(V) ] ""' the card inality of  [ N ] () [ V ]  is small ,  
compared to that of [ N ] (e . g .  I [ N ]  I I I  [ N ] () [ V ]  I � 5)  
b .  Few marriages are divorced in the first year ( ""'  less than 20 % of the 
marriages are divorced in the first year) 
c .  Few INCOMPETENT cooks applied . 
d .  # FEW(incompetent cooks)(applied) ( ""'  less than 20 % of the 
incompetent cooks applied) 
d :  FEW (applying cooks)( incompetent) ( ""'  less than 20 % o f  the applying 
cooks were incompetent) 
e .  [ few(N)(V) ] = [ FEW ] ( U [ N ] f () [ VP ] O)( [ N ] O) 
But (25 . c) can clearly be true , even if (almost) all incompetent cooks appl ied . 
What (25 . c) seems to express is something l ike (25 . d ' ) :  ' only a small percentage 
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of the applying cooks were incompetent' .  This meaning can be arrived at by 
using FEW only indirectly ,  as e . g .  in (25 . e) (this is not Herburger ' s  analysis, 
though it is largely equivalent to it, see the appendix) . In effect, (25 . e) maps the 
Focus onto the nuclear scope and the Background onto the restrictor. 
Note that the problem with (25 . c) disappears under a symmetric analysis of 
few, such as [ few(A)(B) ] = 1 if I [ A ]  n [ B ]  I < n, where n is some suitable 
low number. On such a purely cardinal reading ( ' the number of applying 
incompetent cooks is small ' ) ,  (25 .c) correctly describe the above scenario (all 
incompetent cooks applied) - admittedly alongside almost every other scenario , 
due to the complete vagueness of ' smal l ' , or more precisely , n .  
Whether one prefers the strict semantic version o r  the (very) weak 
pragmatic one, thus, seems to be a matter of taste . Let me nevertheless mention 
a few points that I take to argue in favor of the latter. First notice that few in 
(25 . e) does not invoke any concept of ' smallness , '  but only proportions . Thus 
(26 . a) should be true (since the proportion of prime numbers among the natural 
numbers below is generally small) , which seems wrong (since the total number 
of prime numbers smaller than a million is by no means small) . By contrast , 
(26 . b) is more likely to be judged correct, even though the proportion of prime 
numbers among the numbers smaller than ten is bigger than among those below 
a million. 
(26) a. 
b .  
c .  
Few PRIME numbers are smaller than a million. 
Few PRIME numbers are smaller than ten .  
Many SWEDISH models were at  my birthday party . 
I think the point is even clearer in (26 .c ) .  Just l ike few, many seems to involve 
a contextually given measure of comparison, which in the case of manv must he 
big ,  not just proportions . If only three models were at my h i rthday party . hut two 
of them were Swedish, the proportion of Swedish among the models  at my party 
is high (66 % ) ,  but nevertheless (26 . c) would presumably he judged wrong , 
because two is simply not a big number on any count . 
This account can be further refined if we assume an i ntens ional  (hut 
symmetric) interpretation for few and many , roughly along the l i nes of ( 27 )  (cf .  
Keenan & Stavi 1 986,  Fernando & Kamp , this volume) . 
(27) [ FEW(N)(V) ] = the card inality of [ N ]  n IT V ]  is sma l l , compared to 
what one might expect it to be 
To arrive at Focus sensi t ive effects we superimpose on this a very s i m p l e  ' ru l e '  
of  Focus interpretation :  
(28) BACKGROUND(FOCUS) - FOCUS,  ratherlto a higher deg ree than any 
of its alternatives , makes BACKGROUND(FOCUS )  true 
Applied to (25 .c )  we thus get something along the l ines of (29) . 
(29) incompetent , rather than competent,  makes it true that the number of such 
apply ing cooks is smal ler than one might have expected 
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Such an analysis also seems to fare better wrt. the classical Nobel prize example : 
(30) Many SCANDINAVIANS won the Nobel prize . 
a .  asymmetric account: the number of Scandinavians among the nobel 
prize winners is big (say , more than 50%)  
b .  symmetric account: for Scandinavians (rather than Central 
Europeans) it holds that the number of such Nobel prize winners is 
bigger than one would expect it to be 
(3 1 )  Few SCANDINAVIANS won the Nobel prize . 
a .  asymmetric account: the number of Scandinavians among the Nobel 
prize winners is below 20% 
b .  symmetric account: for Scandinavians (rather than Central 
Europeans) it holds that the number of such Nobel prize winners is 
lower than one would expect it to be 
In the real world, it is argued, Scandinavians won the Nobel prize quite often, 
not in absolute terms , but in terms of probability . Accordingly , (30) seems true , 
while (3 1 )  seems wrong , or at least unfair. This is the situation predicted by our 
symmetric analysis : (30 .b) is true and (3 1 . b) is false . On the asymmetric analysis 
things come out the other way around : (30 . a) is clearly false while (3 1 . a) is , I 
suspect, true . 6 
The last argument against a treatment along the lines of (25 . e) is conceptual 
in nature , namely generality . It should be noted that focus-affected readings are 
systematically absent with strong quantifiers . Consider (32) . 
(32) Most INCOMPETENT cooks applied . 
a .  # most cooks that applied were incompetent 
b .  ' incompetent ' (rather than ' competent' )  characterizes that set X of 
cooks such that more than half of X applied 
According to a rules analogous to (25 .e) ,  (32) should mean (32 . a) ,  which is 
clearly not the case . Note that what distinguishes this case from the ones 
discussed in the previous sections is that we do not only provide additional 
restrictor material , but are allowed to keep material from the N-argument from 
occurring in the restrictor. Obviously , nothing like this happens in cases where 
truth conditions are unanimously detectable , which further strengthens our point 
that the mapping from syntax to semantics is first and foremost compositional 
and that the only source of deviance are additional restrictor variables . Note that 
the analysis sketched in this section seems to do pretty well on examples like 
(32) , as shown by the paraphrase in (32 . b) .  
5 .  Conclusion 
To sum up, we have seen that the phenomena illustrated in ( 1 )  through (3) can 
be handled by the pragmatic account, and that often in specific contexts , the 
pragmatic account fares better in terms of truth and appropriateness conditions .  
Partitive readings of  weak quantifiers result from the fact that the noun, 
but not the quantifier, is part of the background . Hence an NP containing that 
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noun must have been in the D-Topic. This also holds for cases of type partitives 
and generic partitives , not analyzable using a part-of analysis of 'partitivity ' 
(section 2 . 1 . ) .  
Proportional readings of weak quantifiers are just a special case of 
partitives ,  namely one where the background is bigger than just the nominal 
argument to the quantifier (section 2.2) .  
Proportional readings of strong quantifiers result from the interplay of 
TFBS and the pragmatic process of finding a Resource Domain Variable . There 
is no direct association of the Focus value with the resource domain variable , 
which would yield inappropriate truth conditions (section 3 ) .  
Focus affected readings with few and many and NP internal Focus are 
again not due to direct association with Focus but should be handled using a 
symmetric , possibly intensional analysis and a general principle of Focus 
interpretation (section 4) . 
If something along these lines is correct, we seem to face a considerably 
simpler picture than we could expect. Not only can we dispense with additional 
transformations , lexical ambiguity , and specific semantic rules . We are also able 
to maintain a pretty restrictive theory of where and to which degree pragmatic 
factors such as FTBS can enter semantics proper. In particular, we can attribute 
to the FTBS a uniform effect on sentence meaning , an effect that does not rely 
on lexeme or construction specific assumptions . 
What I haven't  dealt with in this paper is the question why of all the 
possible ways to reconstruct a context for these sentences we chose those that 
yield the paraphrases given in ( 1 )  through (3) , when we hear them out of 
context . Roughly , what we do in the default case is form a definite description 
D from the Background and interpret Q N as 'Q of the D' (this doesn't work 
l iterally for (3) , due to the reasons discussed at the end of the last section) . 
Furthermore we try to assume that the Focus is maximally big , i . e .  we 'd  hardly 
interpret MOST boys walked to the STATION with narrow Focus on the PP, 
meaning 'most boys who walked somewhere , walked to the station' , unless we 
are forced to do so by other contextual clues .  Thus we usually only become 
aware of 'proportional ' effects if Focus projection is blocked , e . g .  if an adverbial 
or a verb is accented . A first guess would be that all this follows a strategy of 
'minimal accommodation, ' i . e .  the attempt to reconstruct a maximally small 
context with minimal effort . This aspect ,  however, requires more study . 
6. Appendix: Differences and similarities - A look at four approaches 
In this appendix I ' l l  review the works mentioned rather briefly in the text in 
some more detail . I try to focus on the differences and similarities between the 
approaches . S ince all analyses are concerned with (a subset of) the four 
constructions discussed in the main text , I will use the following shorthands :  SQ­
FV = strong quantifier with Focus in the V-argument; SQ-FN = strong 
quantifier with Focus in the N-argument; WQ-FV = weak quantifier with Focus 
in the V-argument (e . g .  three, some etc . ) ;  WQ-FN = weak quantifier with Focus 
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in the N-argument (Le .  few and many) . 
6. 1 .  Eckardt 1994 
Eckardt ( 1994) uses a rule of LF construal which basically equals that of Heim 
1 982 :  Quantified noun phrases are adjoined to the clause , followed by 
subextraction of the quantifier alone . Thus (33 . a) is mapped to (33 . b) .  
(33) a .  MOSTT boys kissed Amalie PASSIONATELYF. 
b .  [ s  mostl [ s  [NP t1 boysh [s t2 kissed Amalie PASSIONATELY]] ]  
Most then i s  interpreted a s  taking the ordinary and the focus value of the sentence 
as its argument, that is, the distinction between N-argument and V-argument is 
irrelevant . To facilitate comparison I give an equivalent rule in (35) . 
(34) a .  [ most A]  = 1 iff there are more x e [ A ]  ° than x e U [ A ]  f and 
r£ [ A ] o  
b .  The number o f  x which are boys and kissed Amalie passionately is 
b igger than the number of x which are boys and kissed Amalie some 
other way 
(35) Rule E: Q(N)(V) is interpreted as Q( U [ N ]  f n U [ V ]  f) ( [ N ] ° n 
[ V ] O) 
For SQ-FV (as well as WQ-FV) Rule E equals the semantic accounts discussed 
in sections 2 and 3 ,  that is, it derives the default interpretation but fails to 
account for cases like (23) above . For SQ-FN and WQ-FN, Rule E is equivalent 
to (25 . e) d iscussed in section 4, that is, it can treat weak quantifiers but fails 
with strong ones .  Thus (36 . a) becomes (36 .b) at LF and ultimately means (36 . c) .  
(36) a .  MOSTT REDF balloons burst. 
b. most l [S[NP!1 RED balloonsh [s t2 burst] ] 
c .  Most balloons that burst were red . 
6. 2. GeilfufJ 1993 
GeilfuB ( 1 993) avoids subextraction of the determiner by using Rooth' s  ( 1 992) 
squiggle operator. Thus (33 . a) is represented as (37) . This treatment is equivalent 
to Rule G in (38) .  
(37) [5 [NP most(C7) bOYS] 1 [5 [5 tJ kissed Amalie PASSIONATELY] - C7]] 
(38) Rule G: Q(N)(V) is interpreted as Q( [ N ] ° n [ VP ] f)(  [ VP ] 0) 
For SQ-FV and WQ-FV, Rule E and Rule G are equivalent (hence equally 
deficient) . For SQ-FN the outcome depends on where - C7 is adjoined . If it is 
adjoined to the N-argument, the Focus effect is wiped out (since U [ N ]  f 2 
[ N ] O) .  If it is adjoined to the V-argument , the sentence becomes a tautology , 
s ince U [ V ] f = [ V ]  0 ; the latter case is given in (39) . 
(39) a .  [5 [NP most(C7) RED balloons]2 [5[S t1 burst] - C7] ] 
b .  most( [ red balloons ] ° n U [ burst ] )( [ burst ] 0) 
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Since U [ burst ] f  = [ burst ] o, (39 . b) is a tautology . 
6. 3. Herburger 1992 
Herburger' s  treatment differs from the one discussed in section 4 in that she uses 
syntactic movement to construct the relevant configuration:  ' a focused predicate 
inside a VP-intemal NP extraposes at LF . Thereby it . . .  becomes the main 
predicate ' (Herburger 1 992 : 13 ) .  Thus, an LF roughly as in (40 . a) is obtained , 
which is interpreted as in (40 .b) .  
. 
(40) a .  [ 5  e apply [vp[vp [NP few cooks] tv] incompetent] 
b .  3 e  [apply(e) & fewx(cook(x,e» (8(x,e) & incompetent(x» 
This analysis fails for non-intersective adjectives : 
(4 1 )  Few ALLEGED/WOULD-BE/FORMER cooks applied ( ;c few of the 
applying cooks were alleged/would-be/former cooks) 
We can repair this by transforming the treatment into the almost equivalent 
semantic treatment (2S . e) ,  repeated here in a slightly different form: 
(42) Rule H :  lQ NJ VP i s  interpreted as  [ Q ]  ( U  � N' ] f () 
[ VP ] O)( [ [ " ' ] F ] O) = [ Q ] ( U [ N ' ] () [ VP ] O)( [ N ' ] O) 
This rule handles (4 1 )  correctly . In fact it is equivalent to Rule E for all four 
cases .  It should be noted though that Herburger does not deal with SQ-FV or 
WQ-FV . The problem with SQ-FN is overcome by a syntactic constraint against 
extraposing from strong NPs. That, however, would presumably also block the 
derivation of SQ-FV . Furthermore , such a constraint cannot be used in the 
semanticized version needed to handle (4 1 ) .  
6. 4. D e  Hoop 1995 and de Hoop & Sola 1995 
De Hoop and Sola assume that Focus effects only occur with Focus in the V­
argument . Thus WQ-FN is treated as non-truth conditional (an analysis we have 
adopted in section 4) , and no problems with SQ-FN arise . This is obtained 
through a rule l ike (43 ) .  
(43) Rule HS :  
Q(N)(V) i s  interpreted as  Q( [ N ] 0 () X)( [ VP ] 0) , 
where X equals U [ N ]  f if the Focus is within N ,  or X equals U [ V ]  f if 
the Focus is within V (simplified , see below) 
SQ-FV and WQ-FV are treated equivalently to Rules E ,  G, and H « 44 . a» .  SQ­
FN and WQ-FN do not rece ive any special treatment : Any effect of focus in the 
first argument is wiped out «44 . b» . 
(44) a .  Most/few cats purred LOUDLY . � most/few cats that purred purred 
loudly (truth-condit ional effect) 
b .  Few SWEDISH cats purred . � few Swedish cats purred loudly (no 
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truth-conditional effect) 
In de Hoop 1 995 a more sophisticated rule than (43) is presented , namely one 
that states (45) .  
(45) The Focus value of  the focus-containing constituent (X in  the sense of 
(43» is intersected with the property the quantifier lives on . 
(45) differs from (43) only for quantifiers that live on their second argument . 
According to de Hoop 1 995 this holds for the quantifier only ,  as the equivalence 
in (46 . a) shows . 
(46) a .  
b .  
c .  
d .  
[ ONLY(N)(V) ] = [ ALL(V)(N) ] = {w : [ V ] w £  [ N L} 
Only cool people drink beer == All  beer drinkers are cool people == 
the beer drinkers are a subset of the cool people 
Only SWISS l inguists drink. 
¢ All drinkers are Swiss linguists . 
= All drinking Iinraists are Swiss . 
l��r���� � on = [ V��7rJ � [)� ] O)( U [ N ] f n [ V ] O) ( =  
Cases of SQ-FN such as (46 .c) now require a modification of truth conditions . 
(43) and (45) jointly cause (46 . c) to be interpreted as in (46 .d ) .  
However, one can plausibly argue that only in  (46 .b) and (46 . c) is not a 
determiner, but an NP modifier (cf. Rooth 1 985) . At least in cases l ike (47) -
which show the same truth conditional effects as (46 . c) - this is clearly the right 
analysis . 
(47) Only the/some/few/two SWISS l inguists drink excess ively . 
Analyzing only SWISS linguists as [NP only [NP SWISS l ingu ists] ] we can derive 
the correct interpretation without additional rules by the usual crosscategorial 
semantics of only as given in Rooth 1985 . 
(48) Only [NP SWISSF l inguists] drink. 
a. [ SWISS l inguists ] o  = AP", . 3X [swiss(X) & l ingu ist(X )  & P( X ) ]  ::::; 
the set of properties had by one or more Swiss l i nguists 
b .  [ SWISS l inguists ] f = AR . 3SfALT(swiss) & R = APo, . 3X [ S( X )  & 
l inguist(X) & P(X)] z the set of sets of properties P such that there 
is a nation and one or more l inguists from that nat ion have that 
property 
c .  U [ SWISS l i nguists ] f z the set of properties P such that there are 
one or more l i nguists who have that property P 
d .  [ only SWISS l inguists ] o  = AP .vSfALT(swiss) [ 3X [S (X )  & 
l inguist(X) & P(X)] � S = swiss] z the set of propert ies P such that 
if there are one or more l inguists with that property , they are Sw iss 
e .  [ [only SWISS l inguists] drink ] ° z drinking i s  a property such that 
if any l inguist has i t ,  he is Swiss z al l  drinking l i ngu ists are Swiss 
(cf. (46 . c» 
Thus we can avoid using (43) and (45 ) .  
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Endnotes 
1 .  In addition we need a condition to ensure that the D-Topic DT itself may only 
provide information that is contextually given, i . e . part of the Common Ground 
CG (e . g .  it must hold that U [ DT ] 2 [ CG ] ) .  In tandem these two conditions 
ensure that for every sentence S, U [ S ] f 2 CG, i . e . the Background of S is 
uninformative (see Biiring 1995 , chap .2 and Biiring t . a . ) .  
2 .  This presupposes that [ S ] t = { [ S ] fJ for sentences S that do not contain an 
S-Topic . This treatment is a straightforward extension of Roath 1985 . 
3 .  Note that the analysis proposed here does not need to make any commitment 
as to the nature of the generic/ existential contrast. We only note that both types 
of indefinites become 'partitive ' if marked by a topic accent. Strong indefinites 
are just Topic marked existentials . 
4 .  One often gets the impression that the other boys' getting to the station in 
some alternative way is entailed or presupposed by a sentence like ( 1 8 . b) ,  i . e .  
that i t must be continued by something like ' . . .  the others stayed a t home' or 
' . . . the others took a cab' . On closer inspection, however, this turns out to be just 
a conversational implicature . It follows in cases with superset antecedents like 
' the boys that got to the station somehow' by conversational implicature due to 
the Gricean Maxim of Quantity : If the speaker knew that all boys walked , she 
shouldn't use ( 1 8 . b) ,  which is less informative than possible . This implicature 
can vanish just as the superset antecedent can (cf. ( 17) above) : 
(i) I was curious whether the boys would make it to the station. Well, TWOT 
boys W ALKEDF to the station . 
. . .  the others didn' t get there at all/ . . . 1  don't know about the others . 
5 .  Eckardt ( 1 994) considers the possibility of requiring that, on top of (2 1 ) 
(which in effect means: instead of it) it must hold that [ N ] !; U [ V ]  f. That is, 
it is entailed (or maybe presupposed) that, say , in Max polished MOST cars 
CAREFUlLY he pol ished all cars to begin with . Accordingly (23) would be 
plainly contradictory . This , however, is too strong , cf. (i) : 
(i) Max polished MOSTT cars CAREFULLYF, but I am not sure whether he 
polished all of them . 
All we find here is that the speaker must not know that Max polished all cars 
carefully (due to Gricean reasoning again) , which includes the possibil ities of him 
polishing the others i) carelessly , ii) in some unknown manner, or iii) not at al l .  
See also note 4 above . 
6 . This argument goes through even without assuming an intensional analysis . 
The important th ing here is that (25 .e)  compares the number of Scandinavian 
winners to the total number of non-Scandinavian winners , while (28) compares 
it to the number of winners from each other region . Thus five Scandinavians 
would count as many even compared to 100 non-Scandinavians , provided no 
single alternative (say the US) has more than five . The intensional interpretation, 
on top of that , al lows for five Scandinavians to weigh more than 10 Americans , 
say , due to the tota l number of appl icants from both countries .  
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